The French Case of Immigration and the Refusal of History
Several criteria allow us to say that France has been one of the foremost countries of immigration in the twentieth century. Had it not been for the influx of immigrants over the past century, the overall population of France would stand at forty-five million rather than at fifty-eight. Approximately 20 percent of people born in France have at least one parent or grandparent of immigrant origin. If we take great-grandparents into account and include the foreign population born outside French territory, we reach a total of nearly one third of the overall population. So, if one places oneself at the level of what the Durkheimian sociologist Maurice Halbwachs called "I'histoire vecue," "le souvenir," created from individual and family memories, the memory of immigration today affects the French more than it does the Americans.2 And yet, if one puts oneself at the level of "collective memory"-that which is conveyed, maintained, and celebrated by all instruments of public opinion (scholarly works, manuals, monuments, and official ceremonies)-the situation is the reverse. The role played by immigration in the constitution of the collective memory of the French remains completely repressed in their national identity. Conversely, the myth of the United States as a "melting pot," as a place of "refuge" for all peoples, still prevails in the American collective memory. Nathan Glazer recently remarked that one of the major obstacles to curbing clandestine immigration into the United States remains the sentiment that America is still an "unachieved country," which need not have rigid barriers.3
These opposing uses of "memory" reflect the radical difference between French and American immigration. In all countries, the nation-state's constitution is accompanied by a certain number of "myths of origin" destined to reinforce the cohesion of a population which has divided itself into antagonistic groups. In countries where immigration played a decisive role in the initial populating, the theme of "immigrants" often occupies an important place in the constitution of the "myth of origins" (for example in Australia, where 2 1 will not deal here with the statistical problems posed by attempts to classify the French population according to criteria of national origin; nor with the evidence that allows us to say that after three generations there are more French with immigrant ancestors today than Americans with immigrant ancestors; see Gerard Noiriel, Le Creusetfrancais: Histoire de l'immigration (19?me-20?me sivcles) (Paris, 1988) .
3 Nathan Glazer, ed., Clamor at the Gates: The New American Immigration (San Francisco, 1985). collective memory sanctifies English convicts as those who forged the origins of the current population). On the other hand, immigration in France cannot be explained by problems of population. Until the end of the eighteenth century, France was the most populated country in Europe. The first statistical studies devoted to population bemoaned the fact that although French districts existed in most of the large European cities, foreigners were quite few on French soil. 4 As was noted in a recent study, the French "pattern" of immigration "foreshadowed" by a half-century, perhaps even by a century, a process which would become widespread in Europe following the Second World War: the massive resort to immigrant labor as an overexploited work force used in the most devaluated sectors of the industrial labor market.5 It is interesting to note that, in France, from the Second Empire on, the immigration curve closely traced that of industrial development. The "boom" of the 1850s-1870s was accompanied by a doubling of the foreign population (which bordered on a million individuals around 1880). Marked by a severe depression, the following decade saw the number of foreigners stagnate. In a quasi-mechanical fashion during the twentieth century, each cycle of expansion followed by economic crisis provoked a corresponding cycle of immigration-flux and reflux. It is also noteworthy that, as of the Second Empire, foreign workers were particularly numerous in the most mechanized industrial sectors (the textile industry), as well as in the most arduous sectors (mine and agriculture). Finally, the sectors in which immigrant labor was massively employed were frequently also those which had the most stunning rates of development (for example, heavy industry between 1900 and 1930), thanks to the profits gained by firms due to the management of a double labor force: French workers (stable and skilled) and foreign workers (not stable and unskilled).
Historically, it is thus indisputable that the French "pattern" is identified as an "immigration of work." But the question remains why a country which enjoyed an overabundant supply of labor at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution would resort for the next 150 years so continually to foreign labor to complete its economic development. In my mind, the answer to this question highlights two other decisive aspects of the French "pattern" of immigration found, and not by accident, in most European countries following the Second World War: the democratization of the political system and demographic Malthusianism. One of the major effects of the Revolution was a reinforcement of the settlement of a small fragmented peasantry on its land, making this social group numerically the largest. The precocious adoption of universal suffrage in 1848 furnished this peasant mass with the peaceful means of blocking any massive rural exodus and the kind of proletarianization that occurred in Great Britain. The restriction of births, which spread little by little, across the French countryside during the nineteenth century, limited the dispersion of property. By the end of the nineteenth century, Malthusianism had taken such proportions that all great European countries were able to surpass France in population. Henceforth, a demographic deficit (aggravated by the slaughter of the First World War) added to the political obstacles, rendering inevitable the resort to immigration in large industry. The very fact that immigration was conceived as a solution to overcome any obstacles created by the rigidity of the labor market explains in part another characteristic of the "French pattern": the premature and quasi-obsessive resort to police and administrative means to channel the flux of immigrants toward the sectors of the labor market dependent on their presence (for example, the complicated bureaucracy of "identification papers," work contracts, and police surveillance).
This cursory presentation of the French historical "pattern" of immigration suffices to explain why, unlike in other countries whose initial populating was significantly effected by immigration, immigrants in France have practically no place in national memory. During each period of inflow over the past century, in a repetitive and symptomatic fashion, French public opinion has viewed immigrants as transient workers destined to return "to their country" (an opinion shared at the outset by the majority of immigrants themselves). Only the ordinary "populationists" (who emerged at the end of the nineteenth century under the inspiration of such demographers as Jacques Bertillon), haunted as they were by the theme of the decline of the French "race," understood the question of immigration in terms of "assimilation" or "integration" and thus as a durable, irreversible phenomenon. All societies invent their own forms of social classification. In France, the initial weakness of ethnic and racial criteria (due to the antiquity of the process of political homogenization mentioned above) reaffirmed by revolutionary action, in turn led to a hypertrophy of judicial criteria for nationality as the fundamental principle of social classification. Once again, initial circumstances can weigh heavily on a nation's subsequent history. In a recent study, Lawrence Fuchs notes the importance of the theme of a frontier (mobile and passable) in American mythology.9 Equally in French mythology, the question of a frontier plays a significant role, but in a sense radically different than the role it plays in the United States. Since the battle of Valmy in 1792, the French have seen as first and foremost a boundary to be defended, to be preserved against attacks from invaders. As opposed to the United States, France is a small country, a full world, defined, whose territory is totally "cleared" and populated, and has been for some time. The French nation is seen as a state (State) and not an evolution. This rigid concept of the frontier equally triumphs within the republican right of nationality. As of the Revolution, the fundamental line of demarcation between men has passed between the citizen (or at least the "national") and the foreigner. Whereas under the monarchy of the ancien regime a foreigner could exercise high public posts (and even lead armies), as of 1793 only the French had access to the "public sector," only the French could be electors and elected.10 On the other hand, for those who wish to enter the French nation, there is no longer, at least officially, discrimination based on race and religious or ethnic origin. As a whim, I would say that in republican logic everyone has the right to universalism, provided he or she is French."
The disfavor regarding origin brought about by the nascent Republic, combined with this vigorous notion of a fixed frontier which would be seen as a rampart between "them" and "us," help explain why in France we speak of "immigration" ("others coming to our land") and not "ethnicity": thus we see how profoundly dependent we still are on the initial circumstances in which our two republican revolutions occurred. A word must equally be said regarding the means by which a national society can perpetuate certain of its original traits. That which has often been analyzed in terms of the "soul of the people," or more recently as "national identity," should be conceived much more materialistically in terms of institutionalization. As Emile Durkheim understood, what we "inherit" (often without knowing it) are words, judicial norms, and classification statistics which are fixed, having long been stabilized as initial circumstances of national construction. Take, for example, language. The entire "French" manner of thought regarding immigration has been marked by the resources and gaps present in the French language in defining social realities. I believe the difficulty of grasping immigration as a historical process is situated in linguistic pecularities. One must return to the seventeenth century to understand why, in French, we do not have an equivalent of the English term "making," to describe both a social construction and a social movement. Likewise, as the German sociologist Norbert Elias (refugee in France and then in Great Britain) showed, the French notion of "civilization," which according to him was not easily understood by foreigners, designates the result of a cultural process more than a process itself. "It expresses the autosatisfaction of a population whose national frontiers and specific characteristics are no longer questioned, and have not been for centuries, because they are permanently fixed." 12 Such words are but obstacles for thinking of immigration in terms of a contribution to French culture.
The example of the statistical device is another major illustration of the manner in which the founding principles of a national society 11 It is known that Jean-Jacques Rousseau anticipated the dilemma that the Republic of France was never able to resolve the contradiction between the universal (man) and the particular (the citizen, the national). I am not tackling the colonial question, which would complicate the outline presented here. Since the French nation has always been strongly tied to a territory, to a fixed space (the hexagon), the colonial world has never really been considered an integral part of the nation. That is why the rejection of ethnic or racial principles in the "home country" was imposed at a much slower rate in colonial law.
12 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process (Oxford, 1982; 1st ed. 1939).
are able to perpetuate themselves from generation to generation. As we know, the question of race (Blacks and Indians considered as foreigners) has haunted American democracy from its beginnings. In the criteria of national origin, racial and ethnic membership played a fundamental role in the taxonomy of the American census, and as a result, in the American perception of the social world. Conversely, from the beginning in France, the classifications held by the administration were based on "socioprofessional categories" and on the right of nationality.'3 As of the Third Republic, all questions concerning religion, language, and ethnicity were forbidden in taking a census. This restriction has made it extremely difficult for historians to write, for example, the history of Jews in France and has encouraged instead the tendency to limit research on immigration to categories of analysis given by the census: the accent is thus put on the history of "foreigners" (defined by their national membership) who disappeared from the historical scene when they or their children became legally French. In addition to language, law, and statistics, another essential instrument at the disposition of national societies to transmit their original vision of the world rests in the channels of diffusion explicit to collective memory. Here, I will limit my remarks to books which explain the "history of France." Again we must return to the pre-Revolutionary period, to the eighteenth century, to understand the construction of the problematic of legitimate "ancestors" of the French people. In the context of the struggle which pitted the nobility against the "Third Estate," a quarrel led historians from the two camps to fight on this subject. Whereas the nobility affirmed its affiliation with the Frankish aristocracy which conquered Gaul at the beginning of the Middle Ages, the "Third Estate" claimed the Gauls, the vanquished of the medieval contest, as their proper ancestors. From this polarity stemmed a presentation of the history of France in which "racial struggle" closely mirrored "class struggle," a presentation which was defined by the most famous historian of the Restoration, Augustin Thierry. In his eyes the French Revolution marked the victory of the "people of Gaul" over Frankish aristocracy. The myth of "our ancestors, the Gauls," which would be conveyed for more than a century by historical manuals (includ-13 The first census worthy of the name appeared in the middle of the nineteenth century. From the start, in place of the basic distinction between French and foreigners was categorization by nationality, enriched by statistics on "naturalized" immigrants, who even today constitute an essential part of our information on the subject. As for the dominance of "socioprofessional categories," republican power only restated the principles of classification used by the monarchy. See the first "statistical scale" of Vauban and the role of the Physiocrats. ing in African and Asian colonies) became an eminently republican myth. However, it was only with Michelet that republican mythology acquired its definitive face. Challenging, in the name of universalist values held by the Republic, the ethnic vision of history developed by Augustin Thierry, Michelet imposed the theme of the French public as a product of a "fusion," of a "melting pot," in which were merged all the initial ethnic composites of the people of Gaul. And for Michelet, the "fuel" which permitted this "fusion" was the French nation itself, seen as both a nourishing and assimilating land and as an abstract democratic principle which triumphed over all enemies, both internal and external, with the Revolution of 1789. At the end of the nineteenth century, with the triumph of the Third Republic, Michelet's message was reinterpreted as a vision of national reconciliation between aristocracy and the "middle class." The historian Ernest Lavisse, author of historical manuals which constituted, up until World War II, the veritable "Bible" of republican ideology, drove the point home by educating even the members of the smallest village school on this theme of a "melting pot" of people (even if the "gaulist" composite remained the privileged one).'4 This rapid evocation suffices to show that there was essentially a common thread between the French and American mythologies of a "melting pot": the conception of a people forged as a product of a "fusion," contrasting with, for example, the German mythology, which identified the public as a single ethnic group. However, a radical difference separated the French and American mythologies: in the American case, the Revolution inaugurated the "melting pot," and the process continued throughout the entire contemporary era; in the French mythology, the process of a fusion of peoples came to an end with the French Revolution, rendering invisible and unbelievable all "redefinitions" of the French public as having started with the contemporary waves of immigration.
The Political and Scientific Effect of the Reversal of the History of Immigration
Language, law, statistical devices, and mythology of origins thus merged to render the thought of immigration as a historical problem practically inconceivable. This reversal of collective conscious-ness provoked a veritable century-long blindness of research in the social sciences on this question. Considering the role of historians in the production of the myth of origins mentioned above, one should not be surprised that the question of immigration remained absent from their preoccupations until the 1970s. But if one examines the other disciplines, in which the worldly dimension of immigration should have, at the very least, appeared in their reflections on assimilation, the report is the same. Since the end of the nineteenth century, only the disciplines of economics and law have given consistent attention to immigration as a problem, concerned as these disciplines were with food supply, labor market, labor mobility, and the rights of nationality. Durkheimian sociology ignored this question.'5 Sociologists eventually promoted research on the subject in the 1960s; in an intellectual situation dominated by Marxism this work emphasized the work lives of immigrants and their economic exploitation. Finally, until recently, the only two fields which integrated the question of history in their reflection on immigration have been anthropology (initially physical anthropology) and demography, two disciplines which were intrinsically preoccupied with origins and genealogy. But both these disciplines approached this problem with an extremely pessimistic and negative view, making apocalyptic predictions for the future to the detriment of the serene analysis of the past.
From the end of the nineteenth century on, the question of assimilation would be posed in terms which would not vary until the 1950s. All discussion on the subject rested on one dilemma, a veritable squaring of the circle: either the waves of immigrants "flooding" into France would integrate themselves, in this case causing the French population to lose its "identity," or the immigrants would not be assimilated, thus putting the political unity of France at risk due to the formation of "national minorities." This is underlined by Jacques Bertillon, one of the most influential French intellectuals at the end of the last century, who even today is still considered as the "Founding Father" of demography. Bertillon announced the next appearance in France of a Fremdenfrage (foreign question) comparable to Russia or Austria-Hungary, "aggravating our fear for the 15 But it was the writings of Andre Siegfried, published just after the Second World War, that best expressed this logic and its contradictions. Similar to Tocqueville, to whom he was often compared, Siegfried was in his time the foremost French connoisseur of American realities. He was also elected to the College de France and was considered the great forerunner of French "political science." In addition, he was the first to approach the question of immigration from the Franco-American comparative angle. Beginning with the premise that immigration in the two countries is an ancient historical reality, Siegfried concluded that the process of assimilation which occured in both countries did so according to the same laws: at least three generations needed to pass to complete assimilation; but in reality, all depends on the races involved. In the United States, the nordic races" assimilate themselves more quickly. On the contrary, "when dealing with exotic races such as the Chinese, the famous melting pot of races no longer functions." Similarly, in France, the integration of Italians and Spaniards is relatively easy, "but the Chinese always live as foreigners." In the case of France, adds the author, assimilation is even more difficult than in America because "our country has been settled, closed, almost achieved (in the greatest sense of the term) for more than two centuries," and old organisms have more difficulty assimilating new elements. Shockingly, within this argument is found all the republican mythology mentioned above, making the French Revolution a body congealed for eternity. But when one examines Siegfried's proposed solutions to the problem of immigration, one sees that they are irreconcilable with the great principles of 1789. According to him-and Louis Chevalier, who said the very same thing at the same time-the remedy is that finally the French government should equip itself with an immigration policy. The latter must be examined from the point of view "of the preservation of the traditional national character"; it should thus "admit the elements capable of assimilation and exclude the others." Consequently, Siegfried is an affirmed partisan of the policy of an ethnic quota similar to the one that was put to work in the United States during the 1920s, "even if", he adds, "from the point of view of principles, it can be contested because it is tainted with racism."
We are now at the heart of a decisive contradiction which, in large part, explains the impossibility of an immigration policy in France until recently. French intellectuals are incapable of thinking of the question of assimilation in any way other than in terms of "ethnic compatibility" (what is now called "cultural distance"), whereas the practical solutions to such a problem contradict the principles of the French Revolution which were definitively fixed in republican law. Since Adolphe Landry's speech in Parliament in 1915-he was a demographer and minister of the population between the two wars-until 1945, when General de Gaulle wrote his "recommendations" aimed at limiting the naturalization of Mediterranean immigrants (especially Italians), the veritable leitmotif of French political thought on immigration remained unchanged: namely, that in order to preserve the identity of the French people a policy of ethnic selection must be applied. However, it was impossible to do so officially without publicly ridiculing the fundamental principles of the Republic.
What is "National Memory"? I will conclude by placing this analysis of the French and North American cases in the context of a more general theoretical debate on the notion of "collective memory." 18 The current prevailing approach to this question (particularly in France) consists of equating the "I" and the "We." The argument assumes, as Pierre Nora pointed out in his introduction to the first volume of Les Lieux de memoire,'9 a fundamental equivalence between the individual and the collective. Like Jules Michelet before him, Nora writes as if France were a person, who acts, suffers, and remembers. For more than a century the field of political history has developed this paradigm by reasoning in terms of collective entities such as the state, the community, the party, the nation. This tendency is reinforced in the United States today by anthropological and textual perspectives which view the nation as an "imagined community," that is, as a collective representation. Such an approach is perfectly legitimate and has generated many fascinating studies. As an explanatory framework, however, it falls short of answering many questions raised by such notions as "identity" and "national memory."
The angle I have sought to develop in my own research is conceived as complementary to the one described. It raises a question which the paradigms of political history and anthropology take for granted; that is, how do we explain the passage from the multitude of diverse individual perspectives to the collective "we"? This question is at the core of the sociological approach developed by Max Weber, for whom the object of sociology consisted of "deconstructing" reified entities elaborated by law, political history, and philosophy-the party, the state, the nation-in order to understand the individual activities behind them. Such a "deconstruction" is profoundly radical, revealing not only the multitude of group memories which lie behind a given "national memory" (social class, gender, ethnic community), but also the individual memories which are hidden behind these collective group identities themselves. The hypothesis it suggests is that all collective identities (nation, ethnic community, social class) are subjected to identic formative processes. They cannot exist without the prior enterprise of naming or the invention of a unifying, universal concept through which a single representation of the variety of individual experiences is achieved. Secondly, a small number of individuals must position themselves as "representatives" of the designated collective entity, contributing to its very existence by speaking in its name. If these spokesmen succeed in obtaining the recognition that their "community" really exists, the community in question may become consolidated by a process of institutionalization: the state recognizes its rights and makes certain material advantages available, and members of the community are subjected to certain rules, elect their representatives, and so on.
Applied to the study of memory, this perspective is central to understanding the agenda which underlies Maurice Halbwachs's writings on the subject (nowadays often cited without reference to their theoretical implications).20 Individuals are Halbwachs's point of departure, and his entire work is devoted to understanding the sociological mechanisms which condition the passage from individual recollection to collective memory. According to Halbwachs, we all have personal memories (souvenirs) which are not learned but acquired through live experience. Although such events as war, for example, are experienced by a multitude of individuals, each person remembers them differently according to the position he or she was in at the time and according to other events experienced in a lifetime. In order for these recollections to produce "collective memory," Halbwachs argued, they have to be "objective" (objectives); in other words, they must be fixed in writing and constantly recalled by speeches, monuments, and commemorations. Individuals can then link their personal memories to a collective representation of the past. "Entrepreneurs of memory" play a key role in this process; it is they who choose, from an infinite variety of individual memories, those which are best suited to support their cause and transform them into collective memory. Collective memory is not made "at will," however; only by evoking past events which were intensely experienced by a group of individuals can "entrepreneurs of memory" hope to mobilize the group in question. To paraphrase Halbwachs, it might be said that collective memory is likely to be effective when the "wave system" of symbols elaborated by spokesmen (monuments, flags) succeeds in making "each individual's receptor (that is, personal memory) vibrate."
What I have argued, in this respect, is that a "collective memory" of immigration had not yet been forged in interwar France because two alternative expressions of collective identity held the stage. Both drew force and legitimation from recent traumas in the nation's history: Entrepreneurs of "national memory" constantly evoked the First World War, and entrepreneurs of "working-class memory" based their discourse on the traumatic experiences of labor (repression of strikes, work accidents, and so on). The problematic suggested by Maurice Halbwachs therefore raises another question: What happens to a collective memory which can no longer serve as a reference to the individual recollection of lived experiences? This, he argues, is the moment of passage from "lived history" to "learned history," from collective memory to tradition. The stakes involved in memory become more abstract, more remote from the preoccupations of the mass of individuals; its definition is increasingly monopolized by experts for upholding the level of mobilization and collective vigilance which are needed to keep memory alive.
